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ST/\TEMENT OF THE CASE
1<ature Of The Case

~,fark Boncz appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinas
A grand jury indicted Boncz on one count of lewd conduct with a child under the
age of sixteen. (R., p.129.) After a bench trial, the district court found that Boncz was
guilty of the crime.

(R., pp.108, 129.) On March 12, 2010, the district court entered

judgment against Boncz and sentenced him to a unified term of life imprisonment with
15 years fixed. (R., pp.108, 129-30.) Banez did not file an appeal from the judgment.

1

The judgment, therefore, became final on April 23, 2010.
Almost two years later, in February 2012, Boncz filed his petition for postconviction relief. 2

(R., pp.15-25.)

Six months later, in August, he filed an amended

petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
resulting in an illegal indictment and lack of a thorough defense. (R., pp.68-71.) The
state filed a motion for summary dismissal on the basis that Banez had failed to make a

prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.75-81.)

1

While Boncz did file a Rule 35 motion and appeal from the district court's subsequent
denial of that motion, that appeal cannot serve as an appeal from the judgment. State
v. Mosqueda, 123 Idaho 858, 859, 853 P.2d 603, 604 (Ct. App. 1993).
2

Clearly Boncz's petition for post-conviction relief was not timely. See LC. § 19-4902
("An application may be flied at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the
time for appeal. ... "). However, as the statute of limitations issue was not discussed
below, the state will not address it further in this appeal.

1

L.ater, Boncz filed a second amended petition for post-conviction reiief, alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel and a deprivation of his "5th, 6th, and

14th

Amendment rights to a fair trial and due process of law," both on the identical g;-ounds
that 'counsel should have hired an expert on my behalf, and I should have been
permitted to testify."

(R., pp.107-09.)

The state renewed its motion for summary

dismissal. (R., p.115.)
The district court held a hearing on the state's motion. (R., pp.127-28; see also
Tr.)

At the hearing, Boncz's counsel clarified that they were withdrawing the claims

relating to the grand jury and focusing on Boncz's not being able to testify. (Tr., p.11,
L.15 - p.12, L.22.) The district court took the matter under advisement and ultimately
granted the state's motion for summary dismissal (R., pp.129-36), and dismissed
Boncz's petition (R., p.159). Banez filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.140-42.)

2

iSSUF

Boncz states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district 1:ourt err when it concluded, against the
uncontradicted evidence, that summary dismissal was appropriate as to
the c!aims that Mr. Boncz was deprived of his constitutionai right to testify
at trial and received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney
did not permit him to testify?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Boncz failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief?

3

ARGUMENT
Banez Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Summar· Dismissal Of His
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

A

Introduction
!n his second amended post-conviction petition, Boncz asserted that he was

entitled to relief because, he argued, his attorney "should have hired an expert on [his]
behalf, and [he] should have been permitted to testify." (R., pp.107-09.) The district
court summarily dismissed those claims.

(R., pp.129-36.)

district court erred by dismissing his post-conviction petition.

Boncz asserts that the
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-

14.) However, application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case shows
that summary dismissal was proper.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file
.... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing GilpinGrubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

Banez Is Not Entitled To Post-Conviction Relief
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act.

I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a

new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of
establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802;
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).
4

Generally, the

idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-conviction reiief.

Pizzuto v.:..

Howeve,, unlike other civii
comp!aints, in post-conviction cases the "application must contain much more than a
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under i.R.C.P.
8(a)(1)." Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)).
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[s] forth
the grounds upon which the application is based."

~

(citing I.C. § 19-4903).

"The

application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho
548,561,199 P.3d 123,136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903).
Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion. "To withstand summary dismissal,
a post-conviction applicant must present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to
each element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State
v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho
581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to
summary dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact"
as to each element of the petitioner's claims. V\/orkman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at
802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a
court must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required
to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. \Norkman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d

5

at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State. 135 idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110. 112 (2001 )).
"Aiiegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when
(1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not
justify relief as a matter of law." Id.
Articulating and applying relevant legal standards, the district court addressed
and dismissed the claims and assertions contained in Boncz's second amended petition
for post-conviction relief and supporting affidavit.

The state adopts as part of its

argument on appeal the district court's detailed legal analysis, found at pages 4-8 of its
"Opinion and Order on State's Motions for Summary Disposition,!! a copy of which is
attached as "Appendix A."
On appeal, Boncz does not challenge the dismissal of his claim that his attorney
should have hired an expert.

(Appellant's brief, p.9, n.7.)

Because Banez does not

challenge the dismissal of this claim on appeal, the district court's order regarding this
claim should be affirmed. Instead, Banez confines his arguments on appeal to his claim
that he "should have been permitted to testify." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-14.) Primarily,
he argues that the district court "failed to perceive Mr. Boncz's claim that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to testify as separate and distinct from his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to his attorney's refusal to call him to
testify." (Id., p.5.) He also asserts that he made the necessary showing of prejudice to
survive summary dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

(Id., pp.10-

14.) Both arguments fail.
The failure of a defendant to testify may be examined in post-conviction either as
a claim of deprivation of a constitutional right, or as a claim of ineffective assistance of

6

coc;nsel.

Rossignol v. State. 152 1daho 700, 706, 274 P.3d 1, 7 (Ct. App. 20, 2)

(citations omitted). \Nhere the issue 1s viewed as a dep,ivation of a constitutional right,
the defendant bears the burden of establishing that he was deprived of a constitutional
right and the state bears the burden of showing that the deprivation was harmless. Id.

at 704, 27 4 P.3d at 5 (citing State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 522, 708 P.2d 921, 927 (Ct.
App. 1985). Where the issue is viewed as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it
is analyzed under the Strickland 3 standard, requiring the defendant to identify both his
counsel's deficient performance and resultant prejudice .

.kl

Contrary to Boncz's arguments, the district court did recognize that Banez was
attempting to raise his "should have been permitted to testify" claim both as an assertion
that he was deprived of a constitutional right and as an assertion of ineffective
assistance of counsel. (See R., p.132.) The district court first addressed Boncz's claim
that he was deprived of his constitutional right to testify and found that it was
unsupported by the record. (R., p.133.) At sentencing, when given the opportunity to
allocute, Boncz "went on at some length" informing "the trial judge of the many errors he
believed were committed by his trial counsel." (Id.) Banez never claimed, however, that
he was prevented from testifying.

(Id.)

Because there was no evidence supporting

Boncz's claim that he was deprived of the right to testify, the district court correctly
dismissed that claim.
Even if the district court had failed to distinguish the two claims, that would not
impact the ultimate outcome in this case. The only re!evant difference between the two
standards is, assuming that Banez had shown an affirmative deprivation of his right to

3

Strickland v. VVashington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
7

testify (which he did not), the state 1,,vouid have the bcJrden of establishing the absence
of p:eJudice. But in this case the district court did not merely find that Boncz had failed
to show prejudice: it found that there was no prejudice. (R., pp.133-34.)
Boncz asserts that he made a prima facie showing of prejudice because he
claimed in his affidavit that, in addition to denying that he committed the crime, he wouid
have disputed irrelevant facts, such as the location of his bed in relation to his trailer.
(Appellant's brief, p.13; R., pp.102-03.) Banez would not, however, have offered any
exonerating testimony.

(R., pp.133-34.)

Because Banez received a bench trial, the

district court was in the unique position of being able to say with certainty whether
Boncz's proffered testimony would have affected the verdict. The court determined that,
even had he testified, nothing in Boncz's affidavit would have changed the outcome of
this case. (R., p.136.) Therefore, there was no prejudice.
The district court correctly dismissed Boncz's petition for post-conviction relief
because Banez failed to show that he was deprived of his constitutional right to testify at
his bench trial and because, assuming deficient performance, Banez was not prejudiced
by not testifying at his bench trial.

The district court's order summarily dismissing

Boncz's untimely petition for post-conviction relief should be affirmed.

8

CONCLUSION
The state respe:::;tfuliy requests that this Court affirm the district court's order

surnmariiy dismissing Boncz's petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 26th day of September, 2014.

.SPENCER
R
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 26th day of September, 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

Deputy Attorney General
RJS/pm
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

MARK BONCZ,
Petitioner,

v.
STAIB OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO, CV12--00297
OPINION ,A,.ND ORDER
ON STATE'S MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSIDON

This matter is before the Court on 1he State of Idaho's Motion for Summary Dismissal of

Matk Boncz•s Second Amended J?etitlon for Post-Conviction Relief. The Court. having read the

Petitio11t affidavit, bt.efs of the parties, having reviewed transcripts of the grand jury proceedblg,

the court trial, and sentencing, and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.

Mark Boncz was indicted by a grand jury on one collllt of lewd conduct with a minor

under~ years of age in violation of LC. § l 8w508. A comt trlal was held in the matter and,
after hearing testimony from~ Boncz was found guilty of the charge. On Maroh 12,
2010, Bon.oz was sentenced to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction for a unified

Bo"fll»;11.$lt:!¥1J

Opinion. & Order Oil Motion tbr SUmmury ~

Oi29

life sentence, with a fixed period of incercenttion of not less than :fifteen (15';
vears.
O.u }wy 6,
'
.,
2010. Boncz filed a Motion for Reduction of sentence, which was denied by the trial court on
July 27, 2010. Boncz filed an appeal of1he denial of bis Rule 35 Motion for Reduction of
Sentence. However, his sentence was affirmed in~ t:mpublished opinion entered September 71
2011 by 1he Idaho Court of Appeals. Boncz then filed the above-entitled Petition for PostConviction Re~ an Amended Petition for Post.conviction Relief, and a Second .Amended

Petition for Post-Conviction Reliet: The State subsequently filed a Motion fur Summary
Dismissal.
'.POST-CONVICfiON RltJJEF STANDARD

seek relief upon making one of the following claims:
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution of the
United Sta:tes or the constitution or laws of this state;
(2) ThB1 the court was without jurisdiction to impose semence;
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum a.uthoriud by law;
(4) T.batthere exis1S evidence ofmatetial facts, not previously presented end
beard; tba:t requires vacation of the conviction or sent.ence in the interest of
justice;
(5) That his sentence has expired. bis probation, or oonditional release was
unlawfully revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is otherwise
mtlRWfully held in custody or other restraint;
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (f), Idaho Codet that

the peti:iioner is mnoeent of the offense; or
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon
any ground or alleged etror heretofore available under any eo:i:anmn law, statotory
ot other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy.
I.C. i 19--490l(a).
Petltions for post-conviction relief are a special proceeding distinct from the criminal

action that led to the petitioner's conviction. Sanch4$ v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 711, 905 P.2d 642
(CtApp.1995). "An application for post-conviction relief initiat.es a proceeding which is civil in
2
Banca v, State
Opl:mon & Order on Motion for &mmal:7 Dlm,1ua1

O.i30

petition. LC. §

and then prove

proof imposed

for

State.

Idaho 844. 846, 875

"may be filed at any

a

Martmezv.

941 (Ct.App.1994). A petition fur post~nviction relief

v.rithin one (1) year from tbe expimtion

Under I.C. § 19-4906, sumrnary disposition

a petition

time

or

post-conviction relief may

orupon

the petitioner to

711.

is: also

to entitle a petitioner to an evidemisry hearing." Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715
P.2d 369 (Ct.App.1986).

3
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Petitioner's Second Amended Petition seeks post-conviction relief based on claims of
ineffective assistance of connsel !rui viol.arlons ofbis 5th,

flh. and 14th Amendment rights to a fair

trial and due process of law. Spooifically, Petitioner contends trial co1D1Bel did not allow him to
testify in his own defense at trial and trial counsel was ineffective by failing to hire an expert to

tesify on hi! behalf
This Court has "adopted the Strick!.and two-prong test to evaluate whether a
criminal defendant received effective assistance of counsel." Dunlap I11i 141
Idaho 50, 59, 106 P.3d 376,385 (2004) (citing Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687> 104 S.Ct. 20S2, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Mathe1% 133 Idaho
300i 306, 986 P.2d 323. 329 (1999)). In order to survive a motion for ~
dismissal, post-oonviction relief claims bared upon ineffective assistance of
counsel must establish "the existence of material issues of met as to whether: (1)
counsel1s performance WBB deficient, and (2) t1mt deficiency prejudiced appellant's
case." Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 522, 236 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010) (citing
Saykhamcho11ei 127 ldaho at 323, 900 P,2d at 799). To prove deficient
performance, the appellattt "must show the attorney's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Dunlap JJl, 141 Idaho at 59t 106 PJd at
385 (citing Gilptn--Gruhb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002)), To
demonstrate prejudice, the appellant "must show a reasonable probability that, but
for the attomey's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been
different." Id " 'A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undennine
confidence in the outcome.'" Cullen v. Pitihhlster, - U.S.-, 131 S.Ct.
1388, 1403, 179 L.Bd.2d 551 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). This
"requires a •substamia!, not just 'conceivable,' likelihood of a different result." Id.
(quoting Harrington v. Richter, - U.S.-, 131 S.Ct 770, 791) 178 L.Ed.2d
624 (2011)).
The appellant must also overcome ..a strong presmnption that trial counsel was
competent and that trial tactics were based on sound legal stta:tegy:' Dwilap l1I,
141 Idaho at 58-59, 106 P.3d at 384--85 (citing Striddand. 466 U.S. at 689;
Mathews, 133 Idaho at 306,986 P.2d at 329), "'A fmr assessment of attomey
performance requires that every effort be made to eifmina the distorting effects
ofhinds:ight, to reoonstruct the cireumstances of counsers cbaUenged conduct;
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Strlcldand,
466 U.S. at 689. Thus, strategic decisions me "virtually tmcbell,angeable" if made
after a ~ugh investigation ofthe law and facts relevant to plaos.ible
options...." Id at 690-91, Decisions "made after less than complete investigation"
are still reasonable to the extem "that reasonable professioml jndgments sapport
the limitations on investigation." Id. Counsel is permi• to develop a strategy
4
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court it was

understood
court

to

bad the right to testify, but was not required t.o

cmares a clear record by askmg a defendant if he

consulted

it is helpful when a
his attorney and

decided not to testify, in the mstant matter this Court finds the sentencing trauscrlpt helpful in
addressing the issue. Prlor to hnposmg sentence, the trial judge askad Petitioner Boncz if he had
addition to

his effor!.S to discredit the testimony of 'Witnesses. Boncz infowed the trial judge of the many
exrors he believed we.re committed by

(2)

deficiency

of fact as to

was prevented from doing so
counsel's representation was defl.cient. However, Petitioner

failed to meet

second prong of the Stricldand t.est, wb:ieh is to show the existence ofmaterial issues of fact th.at

he was prer..idiced by not being allowed to wstify, During his statement to the c:otut a1
sentencing, Petitioner Boncz provided the court with no exculps.tory facts or evidence not
5
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produced at trial. The same is true of his Petition. as Banez offers the Court no exculpatory facts
not

already presented at trial.
Petitioner suggests in his Petition that his trial C.OU!lSel :fsile.d to present an elremate

perpetrator theory to the court, but he offers no facts that support sach a theory nor does the trial
transcript support Boncz's tbeocy_ There was evidence presented to too oourt that the young
victim disclosed two separate events. The fim event described by 1he victim involved Petitioner
BollQ'.. The 5C001ld event she described involved a thwarted attempt by a dmerent individual
that ooourred several months after the event involving Petiti~ner. The victim was very clear in

differentiating the nvo events and was olear who the perpetrmoc was in each evem. 1 Petitioner

Boncz has presented no new :mets ftmt bring into doubt the facts presented at trial or that 5Upp0rt
in any way his theory that im alternate perpetrator defense should have been presented. Rather.

he merely asserts his trial cout1Sel should have pursued an a1tetmte perpetrator theory despite the
lack of facts or evidence ia support of such a theory,

Next, Petitioner Bon.cz asserts bis trla1 counsel WEB ineffective by failing to hire an expert
to testify in his defense. "Under the second prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance

of counsel, a showing of prejudice requires more 'than mere speculation about whai an expert
witness may have said if trial counsel employed them. Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605,
21 P.3d 924,927 (2001)... S!Jlfv. Stata, 145 Idaho S78, 581, 181 P.3d 504 (Ct.App.2007).

To justify an evidentiaey hearing in a post-conviction relief proceedio.g, it is
incumbent on the applicant to tender writte.n ~ements from potential witnesses
who are able to give testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge.

Dro.peauv. State, 103 Idaho 612,617,651 P.2d 546~ .551 (Ct.App.1982). It is not
enough to simply allege that an expert should have been secured without
prcMdhlg, through affidavits~ mde.0ce of the substance oftb.e expert's testimony,
Hallv. State, 126 Idaho 449,453,885 P.2d 1165, 1169 (Ct.App.1994). Absent an
affidavit from tb.e expert explainmg what be or she would have t.estified to, or
1

Trlal Tr. p. 103.
6
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on

to trial strategy.

impeach the testimony of witnesses, and
inconsistent testimony. Petitioner~ however1 offers no facts that would have allowed bis trial

was wrongly admitted because bis trial counsel failed to object, and he fails to direct the Court to

inconsistent stirteme:nts by

Court v.,1th no

at

wouldhave

different. In the

matter, a oourt trial was held.

prove, de.fined reasonable doubt, discussed the inconsistencies in the evidence, made note of the
limited assistance he received from the expert testimony, and explained the weight that he gave
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to the victim's testimony and why. 2
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Petitioner Boncz offers this Court no new evidence that bas

a reasonable prohabili:ty of 1mdermtQ-l.ng the outcome of the trial. offers no evidence of any

specific failure on the part of his trial attomey that has a reasonable probahilitr of obangjng 'the:
outcome ofthe trial, and offers the Court no affidavit of an expert regarding testimony that
would be presented at an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner Boncz has simply failed to offer this

Court anydrlng more than mere speculation that, but for the alleged ineffective &BSistance of his

trial counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome ofthe 1rial would have been
d:i:ffercnt.

ORDER
The State• s Motion for Sumtrutty Dismissal is hereby GR.A1'11ED.

Dated this

1 Tri;;! Tr. pp. 29Q...296.
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day of October 2013.

